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Abstract 
Today’s car manufacturers resort widely to subcontracting, but the origins of this practice are not recent. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the car manufacturer Louis Renault committed the production of some components 
to external suppliers, although the company is often presented as a comprehensive model of vertical integration. This 
article aims to describe the evolution of subcontracting within the Renault firm from 1945 to the 1970s. This family 
business company constitutes a relevant case study because of its history. During the interwar period, Renault became 
the leading French car manufacturer. The company then undertook a broad diversification of its business activities 
(towards the production of tractors, airplanes, buses, tanks…), but finally chose to focus on its core activity: the 
automotive business. In addition, this firm’s history is particularly interesting due to its close links with the history of 
France in the 20th century (Fridenson, 1998; Sardais, 2005). During this century, the political, economic and social 
events affecting France strongly influenced the company’s activity and constituted crucial turning points in its history 
(war production, nationalisation, privatisation…). The study of Renault’s archives, such as activity reports and internal 
memoranda, allow us to distinguish four stages in  the evolution of the company’s externalisation policy. The 
nationalisation of the firm, at the end of World War II, constituted an interlude in its history. Under state control, the 
firm’s managers started to reflect on the possibility of a subcontracting policy. However, this debate was interrupted by 
strikes in the Billancourt factories. A real subcontracting strategy was implemented from the 1950s, after being hotly 
debated by the firm’s stakeholders. A great number of memoranda on the subject reveal a passionate debate on the 
advantages and disadvantages of subcontracting. The premises of this policy were not clearly affirmed, but they 
constituted the beginning of an irreversible process. 
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Introduction 
 
Outsourcing is a phenomenon that is frequently discussed in the economic, social and political news 
media. Often connected with relocation and consequently suspected of endangering jobs, it has 
often had a bad press despite studies revealing more mixed effects
3, yet the trend has continued 
inexorably, even extending to public services
4. In fact, far from being new, the phenomenon is part 
of a cycle with a long history. The aim of this article is to trace the history of outsourcing
5 through 
the study of an emblematic sector, that of the automobile, and in particular, of the French company, 
Renault. 
The history of the automotive company Renault can be compared with those of other 
manufacturers, such as Ford or Fiat. These firms were established under the Second Industrial 
Revolution on the initiative of either one man, or groups of engineers or self-educated persons 
passionately fond of technology. Initially, the automotive industry was characterised by the small-
scale production of cars, sold to rich customers. Nevertheless, it rapidly became a field where major 
managerial innovations were introduced, in order to allow the large-scale production of vehicles. In 
the aftermath of the Second World W ar, many car manufacturers that were previously highly 
integrated, producing most of the components used in production themselves, gradually resorted to 
subcontracting. This industrial strategy was initially motivated by the wish to reduce the production 
cost of vehicles and it has been implemented to a greater extent since the beginning of the 1970s 
(Loubet, 1998). Suppliers gradually became partners and their presence in all stages of the 
production process, from design to assembly line, increased. 
The period between 1898 and 1920 was characterized by the transition from very limited production 
(10 vehicles per year) to mass production that was only affordable with the use of outside suppliers. 
In 1898, Louis Renault created the « Société Automobile Renault » with financial help from his two 
brothers. To make his vehicles better known in a highly fragmented sector, he took part in car races 
in France and Europe. Although this strategy rapidly paid off since Renault vehicles scored many 
victories, it was only when the company won the contract for Parisian taxis in 1905, that its small-
scale production became industrial (production rose from 1,179 to 5,100 cars between 1905 and 
1910). Moreover, Renault’s status changed from fitter to manufacturer when it started making its 
                                                 
3 Report of the Economic Analysis Committee, Désindustrialisation, délocalisations, Bibliothèque des rapports publics 
– La Documentation française, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/brp/notices/054000102.shtml. 
4 See for instance: Walker D, Report recommends easier outsourcing, The Guardian, Wednesday July 2 2008 [“A draft 
of her report (written by business economist Deanne Julius), due to be published on July 10, says the time is ripe for 
“significant expansion”, provided public bodies impose fewer conditions of a “social or environmental kind” in 
contracts”] or Reilly P., Tamkin P.(1997), Outsourcing: A Flexible Option for the Future?,  IES Reports, No.320. 
5 This merits a more wide-ranging approach because starting with the paternalist policies of the 19
th century, 
subcontracting has also involved such varied activities as accommodation, health, staff restaurants, maintenance, 
information technology, invoicing, recruitment, etc.    
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own engines (Loubet, 2000). At the same time, heavy demand for ancillary products such as utility 
and  commercial vehicles led Louis Renault to diversify his production. This trend gathered 
considerable momentum during the First World War when the Renault factories were given over to 
production for the armed forces whilst continuing to manufacture automobiles. This was how the 
Billancourt factory came to manufacture rockets, guns, canons and tanks as well as tractors, lorries, 
and utility and leisure vehicles. Diversification was accompanied by a desire for independence from 
the various suppliers and this was embodied, at the end of the War, by the implementation of a 
strong policy of vertical integration.  
In the interwar period, this industrial policy was continued, enabling Renault to control the entire 
production process from the extraction of raw materials to the production of capital goods and 
finished products with the exception of a few rare products such as car windscreens. Renault 
therefore constituted a highly integrated industrial unit, as its Director declared in  1933: «  The 
Renault factories form a whole. They are self-sufficient, using raw materials they manufacture 
everything  » (Fridenson, 1998, p.31).   
 
The story we are about to retrace took place over the years 1945 to the 1970s. It was then that 
subcontracting really took off at Renault. We will try to determine the factors that triggered and 
fostered the process, as well as those that curbed it since the recourse to outside suppliers did not 
occur in a straightforward linear manner and the question of doing or having done was constantly 
being raised even if it mean re-integrating the manufacture of certain products. At the end of the 
article, we will detail the contributions we have made: historic, in a field which has been the subject 
of very few studies of this type, but also more general (on the economic effects of subcontracting) 
and theoretical (on client-supplier relations). 
 
The immediate post-war period: tentative but determined beginnings 
 
Despite caution bordering on distrust linked to the security of supplies, the fear of dependency and 
concerns over price and quality levels, from 1945 onwards, Renault was subject to strong 
constraints that were to lead it down the road to outsourcing. 
 
The reasons for caution 
After the War, Renault was characterised by a high level of integration and diversification:  
«  Régie Renault presents a typical example of vertical concentration, since its manufacturing 
cycle is based on raw materials (coal, cast iron, standing timber, rubber, copper ingots, etc.)  
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and includes the manufacture of most of the parts needed for motor vehicles which it then 
assembles from start to finish » [Annual Management Report, 1945, p.13]
6.  
This industrial strategy did not seem to be questioned by the new Chairman and Managing Director, 
Pierre Lefaucheux, appointed head of the Renault factors after the Liberation.  Despite difficulties 
in obtaining supplies and the dilapidated state of the factories at the end of the War, he declared:  
« This policy has raised, and will continue to raise, protests on a daily basis from companies 
wanting to become or once again become, suppliers for the Renault factories. Without wishing 
to open a debate on the advantages of, or justification for, vertical concentration, we would 
simply like to observe that: 
-  As a result of their large-scale production, our secondary workshops have been able 
to install more modern and more advanced equipment, and to work with lower 
overheads than most of the smaller, more run-down outside companies;  
-  during 1945, our difficulties in obtaining supplies were more acute in the case of the 
few fittings we bought in from outside, than for those we made ourselves.  
Personally, I am therefore against reducing our activity in favour of lesser companies in the 
independent sector » [Annual Management Report, 1945, p.13-14]. 
The accent was therefore placed on the quality of plant, costs, and security of supplies. Outside 
suppliers were not considered able to give sufficient guarantees on these various aspects. 
Although Lefaucheux expressed his hostility towards using outside suppliers, the strategic choices 
Renault had to make raised complex problems. The diversification of its activities during the War 
(increase in the number of civilian products, tractors, lorries, planes and military vehicles, rockets, 
guns and tanks) called the rationale of resource-hungry vertical integration into question. Moreover, 
those in charge of industrial planning
7 wanted Régie Renault to specialise in the production of 
lorries because of its close links with Berliet, which had met the same fate as Renault after the 
Liberation
8. Lefaucheux was against this. Although he wanted to rationalise the industrial tool, he 
was not in favour, at first, of abandoning certain products and continued to pursue the same vertical 
integration policy by creating the Société Nouvelle de Roulements in 1946. Moreover, difficulties in 
obtaining supplies and the high cost of raw materials reinforced the company’s wish for 
independence:  
 
                                                 
6 Renault’s Reports were consulted in the Archives Renault.  
7 Post-war planning Commission in charge of (flexibly) programming production. See: Scott B., Macarthur J. (1969), 
Industrial planning in France, Harvard University Press and Fourquet F. (1980), Les comptes of la puissance Histoire 
of la comptabilité nationale and du Plan, Ed. Encres. 
8 Nationalisation after collaborating with the Nazi regime.  
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« Our supplies departments have often met with serious difficulties in obtaining the  raw 
materials and fittings we do not make ourselves from our outside suppliers. They have had to 
employ unwavering perseverance and zeal to obtain the necessary deliveries in time
9. […] the 
Régie  suffers from its heavy dependence on certain outside companies who have not 
understood the imperative need for French industry to make technical advances in order to 
lower its costs whilst at the same time improving quality » [Annual Management Report 1946, 
p.29]. 
In an uncertain strategic context, the management of Renault stuck to its basic beliefs: security of 
supplies at a controlled cost, independence and, what were to be the key factors of the sector’s 
success for a long time to come; technical expertise, quality and costs
10. The caution, even distrust, 
brought about by the first pressures (these are not very explicit) to outsource on the part of suppliers 
or indirectly, the Planning Commission, are therefore part of the company strategy itself. However, 
other constraints were to emerge.  
 
Mass production and pressures to outsource 
1947 saw the beginning of mass production with the 4CV, which was to be at the origin of an 
initially timid change of policy as regards the use of outside suppliers. When he became Director of 
the Renault factories, Lefaucheux wanted, on the one hand to create an industrial complex adapted 
to mass production, and on the other, to launch a cheap car (Loubet, 2000). The 4CV, the new 
model chosen by Lefaucheux despite opposition from the entire management team, was destined to 
implement this strategy. Its launch was rapidly a resounding success both on a commercial and 
industrial level to the extent that the maximal production threshold was quickly reached. Armed 
with this success, Lefaucheux chose to expand the range of vehicles offered by Régie Renault rather 
than to count on an increase in production volumes which would imply true mass production.  
In the circumstances, the use of outside suppliers became inevitable since Renault had neither the 
facilities nor the funding needed to apply such diversification at every stage of the value chain. 
Since the production of the 4CV took up most of the company’s own resources it was decided to 
call upon outside suppliers for the other products. Certain products, such as the bodywork for 
vehicles other than the 4CV were, for example, entrusted to outside suppliers close to Régie Renault 
such as Chausson Carrosserie (Loubet, 2000). At the same time, the production of certain parts 
needed for all vehicles and traditionally manufactured within the company was transferred to 
                                                 
9 The Annual Management Report of 1946 states in fact, that « the price of materials and that of the fittings purchased 
from outside amount respectively to around 19% and13% of our cost price » (p.29).  
10 Delivery times have not yet been mentioned.  
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outside suppliers after discussions on the validity of maintaining such production when buying the 
parts might prove more profitable. This was the case with dynamos: 
“We have been able to give up making our dynamos ourselves since a French manufacturer 
having made efforts to modernise, can now supply us with these products at a lower price 
than that which we could obtain ourselves with the plant at our disposal"  [Annual 
Management Report, 1947, p.21]. 
The comparison between the internal production cost and the price of buying materials and fittings 
of equivalent quality encouraged the transfer of part of the production process to an outside 
manufacturer. Moreover, this way of thinking was part of a wider policy aimed at rationalising and 
simplifying the industrial tool of Régie Renault. Caution remained its watchword, however: 
“Despite our wish to simplify the running of our company by ceasing to make many products 
ourselves, we cannot find the quality or price we obtain from our own workshops elsewhere 
and are forced to admit that the Renault factories’ policy of vertical integration still largely 
pays off and that we will pursue it despite all the disadvantages it may entail and that we well 
know, for as long as our potential suppliers have not made the necessary efforts” [Annual 
Management Report,1947, p.21].  
Renault therefore remained faithful to internal production but had begun to feel the need to 
outsource. Despite these reservations, external purchases increased significantly from the middle to 
the end of the 1940s. 
 
Table 1 – The rapid increase in external purchasing 
  1946  1947  1948 
% of outside 
purchases present in 
the cost price 
 
 
32% 
 
40% 
 
50% 
 
Over these years, the price of materials and fittings rose sharply as a result of inflation. The high 
cost of materials and in particular of steel industry products
11  was a recurring theme in the memos 
and reports of Régie Renault and constituted a real curb to outsourcing. Moreover, the prices 
applied by certain suppliers sometimes proved higher than those on the world market. Over and 
above these reasons for caution, Renault urged its suppliers to improve the prices and quality of 
their products so that the move towards subcontracting could continue. It is true that as a result of 
                                                 
11 In the annual management reports of Régie Renault, numerous criticisms were levelled at the steel industries, accused 
of favouring the international market to the detriment of the domestic market by voluntarily imposing high, and 
therefore profitable prices on French companies in order to trim those applied to foreign companies (Cf. Annual 
Management Reports of 1945 to 1949).  
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its high level of vertical integration and its production rhythms, the Régie possessed a certain power 
of negotiation. At the same time, other factors were influencing the change of policy.  
 
Foreign Models  
From the outset, the automobile sector had always been prime territory for managerial innovation 
and in particular, for ideas from America and Britain. At the dawn of a decade characterised by an 
increasing openness to foreign markets, the experiments of American and British manufacturers 
were models that encouraged outsourcing. Reports of foreign experiments by Renault managers laid 
the emphasis on two procedures with the same objective: the reduction of manufacturing costs. The 
first procedure involved the standardisation of parts for all the different vehicles manufactured, the 
second aimed at closer cooperation between manufacturers and suppliers, since the latter could then 
benefit from bigger orders if certain parts were standardised. But the directors of Renault remained 
ambivalent with regard to outsourcing. The Reports of foreign experiments were punctuated by 
alarming declarations on the state and the future of a French automobile industry that was incapable 
of rivalling its British competitors:  
« The French automobile industry is still suffering from deficiencies in too many branches of 
French industry, even the most powerful of them. For its part, it is guilty of not having made 
its suppliers’ task easier, by not having standardised its parts and fittings models enough (…) 
it would be preferable for French manufacturers to work more closely together to simplify the 
work of their suppliers and make it more productive by reducing the number of models and 
formats they require  » [Annual Report, 1948, p.24]. 
The Régie placed the blame in particular on suppliers who had not made the investments needed to 
modernise their equipment without which the cost price of vehicles could not be reduced on account 
of the high cost of m aterials and salary increases. Standardisation was also at the heart of the 
problem: 
« The manufacturers AUSTIN, FORD, ROOTES, STANDARD and VAUXHALL will take 
immediate steps to accelerate the use of common spare parts and fittings for their models and 
to develop standardisation in general (…) But French manufacturers have only to follow such 
a striking example. And for them, I fear it is a question of life or death » [Annual Management 
Report, 1948, p.24]. 
These various elements reveal the indecision of the Renault managers, torn between the needs of the 
moment and their distrust of the suppliers on the one hand, and on the other, a complex situation 
that was a mixture of international competition (and the beginning of «  coopétition »
12), the high 
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cost of the input (raw materials, manpower, etc.), the production of long runs and standardisation. 
Another factor that was to prove crucial in the end was the impossibility of investing heavily single-
handed.  
 
Outsourcing driven by the volume of investments 
We have seen that the recourse to outside suppliers was mainly governed by calculations in terms of 
cost price. But other factors were at the root of the process. The start of mass production of the 
4CV, followed by that of the Dauphine, as well as the manufacture of other leisure and commercial 
vehicles called for the mobilisation of major production resources, both human and material. The 
extent of vertical integration that still characterised Régie Renault at the time made the high level of 
resources needed to implement mass production programmes all the more evident. Outsourcing 
therefore became a necessity. Moreover, as a result of the diversity of products, the lack of space in 
which to assemble certain vehicles in the Renault factories at Billancourt
13 also provided a reason to 
look outside: 
« Certain manufacturing tasks were entrusted to a factory in Alsace that had been hit by 
financial difficulties as a result of the farm tractor crisis (…) we entrusted the stamping and 
assembly of 300kg car bodies to a manufacturer specialising in such work, who also produced 
the shells for the ‘Colorale’ series and several components of the bodywork for the Frégate. 
This policy, new to our brand, of calling on outside help, was not adopted without hesitation, 
nor achieved without problems. It was not easy for us to find suppliers who we could be 
certain would respect our own assembly rhythms and whose prices were not too different from 
ours (…) we called upon fittings manufacturers (electrical material, spark plugs and complete 
units such as gear boxes, universal joints, steering systems, brakes, and moulded aluminium 
parts) to a far greater extent than in the past. There was a risk, in fact that we would not be 
able to launch our new private car, the Frégate, if we relied on our own resources alone.» 
[Annual Management Report, 1950, p.19].  
This statement from the Chairman and Managing Director highlights the increased use of outside 
suppliers. Compared to the first steps in this direction taken immediately after the War, the motives 
prompting this process seem to have changed. The arguments of Lefaucheux, who is no longer 
demanding a purchase price strictly lower than the production cost in order to subcontract the 
production of certain products, have altered slightly.  The process can now take place as long as the 
prices applied outside are not too far removed from those obtained by Régie Renault. The increase 
in the pace of production and the continued diversity of the various ranges of vehicles necessarily 
                                                 
13 . Renault’s original production site, near Paris.  
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entailed an increasing need for resources that Renault could not meet independently. Although the 
cost price of manufacturing a vehicle still remained a determining factor in the decision to 
subcontract, the impossibility of  completing certain manufacturing programs with the existing 
resources made outsourcing an indispensable policy. Although this consisted in the first instance of 
entrusting certain very specific production processes such as part of the manufacture of the 
‘Colorale’ and ‘Frégate’ vehicles to specialist suppliers, the process accelerated very rapidly with 
the move to outsourcing highly standardised products such as fittings (brakes, spark plugs etc.).  
Another factor was to reinforce the  Régie’s change of industrial strategy. The acceleration of 
production rhythms in all the various programs called for major investments that Renault could not 
make alone. The maintenance and modernisation of industrial plant calls for continuous investments 
and Renault’s financial resources could not cover these expenses particularly since it wanted to 
diversify production. The turning-point leading to subcontracting had therefore been reached.  
In 1950, as a result of the success of these first experiments in outsourcing, Lefaucheux expressed 
his wish to continue the process that would allow Renault to increase its production volume and 
enter into international competition without placing undue strain on its financial resources by 
making heavy investments.   
« The current experiment has been satisfactory so far and we are anxious to pursue the same 
policy as our major foreign competitors which would allow us to increase production without 
increasing our investments beyond the limits of our resources » [Annual Report, 1950, p.19].  
The limitation of investments therefore became a recurring argument put forward by Lefaucheux to 
justify the continuing use of outside suppliers for certain manufacturing processes. 
For one thing, the mass production of the Dauphine required a great deal of space in which to set up 
the assembly lines. So the need for space was added to material and technical needs. The 
Billancourt f actories were much too cramped to absorb all the production processes despite 
continually extending the buildings. In these circumstances and in order to avoid extremely heavy 
investments, the subcontracting process was intensified:   
« These calls on outside help, and those we have already launched in other fields (in 
particular, light, pressure cast metals) have been dictated by the problems we encountered 
ourselves either in financing, or in extending the physical boundaries of our existing plant. In 
this way we have been able to avoid buying new dishing presses and extra pressure casting 
machines and extending our aluminium foundry » [Management Report, 1951, p.24].  
The increasing use of outside suppliers and the need for space dictated by production volumes were 
combined in the move to the provinces of the Billancourt manufacturing processes, the latter 
retaining only the production of vehicles  – an early form of relocation. This is how all the  
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production processes relating to bearing techniques came to be transferred to a Renault factory in 
Annecy. The decongestion of the Billancourt site continued in 1952, despite strong opposition, with 
the building of a factory in Flins (40 kms west of Paris), where the manufacture of the 300kg van 
was transferred.  The « forge and thermal treatment processes and the machining of many parts and 
units, in particular, the back axles of all  [our]  vehicules » [Annual Report 1951, p.24] had 
previously been transferred to new buildings in Le Mans (200 km from Paris). So the 
« decongestion »
14 of Billancourt became a necessity justifying on the one hand the relocation to the 
provinces of certain production processes, and on the other, an increasing recourse to outsourcing. 
The early 1950s therefore marked a major turning-point in Renault’s industrial strategy. Although 
the use of outside suppliers had hitherto been absent from management reports, this policy, 
described by Lefaucheux as « vertical disintegration »
15 was distinctly present at the beginning of 
the decade. The results of a study on the characteristics of Régie Renault’s suppliers were published 
in the Annual Management Report of 1951. This study aimed to « see whether a rational criterion 
existed that would enable us to orient our searches  [for suppliers ]  in the future ». This study 
highlighted the fact that the Régie’s suppliers were mostly SMEs. However, Lefaucheux did not 
wish to draw any conclusions from the criterion of size
16 and preferred to place the emphasis on the 
extent of the investments these firms made in terms of research and development. In his opinion, it 
was only through investments of this kind that companies could offer highly specialised products of 
high quality, able to rival foreign manufacturers (Loubet, 2000). When this report was being 
written, foreign competition was not a major concern because of the ambient protectionism. 
However, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 was to open up new 
opportunities in the outsourcing process.  
 
From 1950 to 1970: a deliberate strategy 
From the 1950s on, recourse to outside suppliers proved to be inextricably linked to Renault's 
strategy and led to the reorganisation of client-supplier relations. The internationalisation of the 
Régie gave momentum to the subcontracting process. 
 
                                                 
14 The 1951 Annual Report clearly mentions the wish to decongest Renault’s original site.   
15 Cf. Annual Management Report 1951, p.24.  
16 Lefaucheux made a quick comparison of the French and American industrial fabric regretting that a spirit of small 
enterprise still existed in France: « There are many giant firms in America. More than 90% of small companies live very 
well because they have rejected the so-called « artisan » spirit. They have specialised in a single product or category of 
products (...). This schema of a small, highly specialised, highly competitive company is not widespread enough in 
France where the idea of a small-scale craftsman  all too often still rules, whereas another attitude should be developed 
without delay » [Annual Management Report, 1951, p.25].   
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A place and a role to be defined within the organisation  
The subcontracting process, which began tentatively immediately after the War, was then 
considered as necessary on account of the company’s ongoing deconcentration strategy. In 1954, 
the halt to the manufacture of tyres, the production of which had begun in 1934, was a clear 
indication of this. Louis Renault had wanted to manufacture tyres from the very beginning to avoid 
being dependent on the tyre firm Michelin, but manufacture had finally to cease in the face of 
foreign competition which had obtained a far better quality-price ratio through subcontracting and a 
higher level of supply than the Régie could provide. Symbol of a historic decision, the halt to the 
production of tyres heralded the implementation of a real policy aimed at rationalising the industrial 
tool, the immediate consequence of which was the increasing use of subcontractors.  The opening 
up of the frontiers was to reinforce this trend:  
« In 1954, the Régie pursued the policy it had implemented over the preceding years to perfect 
manufacturing processes, reduce prices and create good conditions under which to tackle 
competition in view of the deregulation of intra-European trade (…). The activities of the 
various departments of the Régie were constantly being revised. It was following one such 
examination that the manufacture of tyres was gradually abandoned. In addition, the 
manufacture of a greater number of parts and fittings was subcontracted» [Management 
Report, 1954, p.25].  
By shedding some of its manufacturing processes, Renault increased its use of outside suppliers, 
whose numbers continued to grow.  In 1955, these suppliers, now called « sous-traitants », i.e. 
“subcontractors” in the Régie’s reports, numbered 3,000
17 and further considerable increases were 
planned for the following years as a result of the ever-wider application of this strategy.  
The number and strategic importance of the subcontractors within the Régie obliged the latter to 
consider the role and the place they should be given within the organisation.  In 1957, during an 
internal conference on the organisation of production, the manager of the Manufacturing 
Departments suggested that, in view of the high level of competition and a situation that vacillated 
as tastes in cars changed, Renault should include subcontractors in the organisation of its production 
processes. The aim of this was to « alert all the suppliers of steel, sheet metal, fabric, tyres, fittings, 
and glass so that they will be equipped to deal with our production cycles »
18. The Report also 
states that researching a manufacturing program requires a time-span of 3 to 5 years, during which 
the management defines the program and the cycles. The use of subcontractors was planned from 
this program onwards so that external supplies could be provided under the conditions laid down by 
                                                 
17 Cf. Annual Management Report 1955, p. 27.  
18 Report on a technical conference held on 31 January 1957 on the organisation of production made by the head of the 
Central Office of Manufacturing.   
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the manufacturing research office. The integration of subcontractors into the production program 
would seem to indicate changes in the relationships between Régie Renault and its suppliers. By 
becoming suppliers of the Régie, subcontractors were committing themselves to a relationship of 
dependence and authority. The signature of a specifications document indicating the terms of the 
order placed Régie Renault and the subcontractor in a relationship of controller-controlled. This was 
a bureaucratic mode of control (detailed specifications followed by specifications of the products 
and working procedures of the subcontractors) made possible by the heavy degree of dependence of 
the subcontractors on the Régie (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2006).  
In 1960, the  reorganisation of the Quality Department within  Régie Renault confirmed these 
changes in the relationship with suppliers. A « central technical reception department » was set up 
whose  job was to «  monitor the quality of the parts, units, fittings, raw materials, semi-raw 
materials, and machining work provided by the outside suppliers »
19. Amongst its various tasks, 
this department, which was directly attached to the supplies department had to «  ensure that the 
specifications were respected by checking the supplies either on the supplier’s premises before 
delivery or on reception in our factories for confirmation series parts, pre-series parts and series 
parts »
20. It was given a great deal of latitude and «  could carry out all the inspections on the 
quality of supplies from outside » as well as making unscheduled visits to any of the factories 
belonging to the Régie’s suppliers. These inspections were recommended in order to «  determine 
the extent to which they [the suppliers ] are capable of producing quality supplies or to advise  them 
on the organisation of quality in their factories »
21. It can therefore be said that subcontractors were 
almost completely assimilated by the Régie, since it was at liberty to carry out checks on working 
procedures and the quality of the supplies. 
Because of the development of subcontracting and since it had only recently been introduced, the 
quality control of parts from outside suppliers acquired considerable importance to avoid the 
reasons for its implementation and in particular, the reduction in cost price being called into 
question on account of quality defects. For example, an internal document, dated April 1960 and 
sent to all the staff in the Quality management team, set out on the one hand an organisation chart of 
the unit and on the other, all the remits and tasks of each of its departments. A description of all the 
quality control processes for parts produced by subcontractors was given, highlighting its 
importance in the production programs. 
The Quality Department was not the only entity in Régie Renault to undergo radical reorganisation 
as a result of outsourcing. In the face of a sharp increase in supplies from outside, a redistribution of 
                                                 
19 Appendix III of an internal memo dated 19 April 1960 to the heads of the quality department  
20 Appendix III of an internal memo dated 19 April 1960 to the heads of the quality department 
21 Appendix III of an internal memo dated 19 April 1960 to the heads of the quality department   
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responsibilities between the Purchasing and Manufacturing departments was carried out in order to 
define the field of operations for each of these departments. The aim of this reorganisation was to 
identify a single contact for external suppliers so as not to hinder the smooth running of the 
production programs:  
« The objective is that the factories deal with reminders; claims and all other problems with 
the suppliers that mean either side taking a stand in one way or another will be dealt with 
exclusively by the Purchasing department. It has to be understood that the hierarchy of the 
factories should not have any direct contact with the suppliers that could be interpreted by 
them as a stance on the part of the RNUR and undermine the united front presented by the 
RNUR to the outside world » [Memorandum n° 1 110 to the Directors of the Purchasing and 
Manufacturing departments, September 1969].  
 
Confirmation of the new policy 
The organisational changes brought about by the acceleration of the « vertical deconcentration » 
process in the Régie were emblematic of the strategic turning-point in Renault’s industrial policy. 
From hereon, the new strategy was taken on board as an internal document listing the reasons for 
the move to subcontracting attests.  Six reasons are put forward to justify the move to external 
production:  
« the limitation of investments; subcontracting gives a certain flexibility as regards staff; the 
advantage of separating long and short runs ; it is highly likely that certain products or 
techniques will never reach a turnover high enough to enable them to bear the research costs 
or methods they require ; the high salaries in the automobile industry and our non-
discrimination between Paris and the rest of France weigh heavily on our cost prices 
compared to those we might obtain from provincial suppliers; the salutary effect of 
competition should not be underestimated» [Internal memorandum n°611 of  28 January 1964 
to the directors of the D.G.F].  
These six arguments can be grouped, as this memorandum states, into two more general motivations 
corresponding on the one hand to a lack of capital, and on the other, to the wish to lower cost prices. 
Ever pragmatic, the directors of Renault identify, in the same memorandum, the constraints linked 
to this strategy; it is a question of « the use of certain categories of staff that the disappearance of 
certain production processes would make difficult, design and manufacturing methods [and once 
again] self-sufficiency ». However, these reservations seem fairly useless in the face of the degree of 
outsourcing reached by Renault. It is the details of outsourcing that are now under discussion.  
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A document attached to the memorandum of January 1964 states that the «  decision to outsource 
having been taken, it now remains to define the form it should take in practice ». Two solutions 
were envisaged: the first was purchasing, that is to say «  asking others to make all the efforts 
needed to obtain a product or use a technique »; the second is  sub-contracting, that is to say 
« retaining the industrial ownership of the product to be made and consequently, the research 
technicians, with the chance to revoke the decision to outsource ». In the latter case, the general 
managers still have two possibilities, one being to subcontract to a company that is completely 
independent of the Régie; the other to subcontract to an existing subsidiary or to create one. Ways 
of outsourcing therefore remain to be defined in the case of future subcontracted processes. 
Although purchasing had hitherto been favoured in order to limit internal investments, the 
constitution of subsidiaries was now being envisaged since it would also help attenuate fears 
cantering on labour policy.  
A memorandum concerning the «  Human implications of the move to outside manufacturing » 
dated 18 February 1964 followed on from the preceding document and examined the social 
constraints of outsourcing. The notes made on the first page of this document by one of its 
recipients reveals the tone of its contents, «  attached are ideas given in a meeting on a policy of 
moving to outside manufacturing. They are not especially encouraging and in all these problems 
the point of view of the D.C.P.R.S.
22 is no fun for the others !  »
23. Indeed, this document, after 
having examined the consequences of subcontracting in human terms, concluded with the following 
recommendations: « a change such as this is therefore especially delicate, in particular in the older 
factories. It would seem therefore, that from the point of view of labour policy, the move to 
subcontracting should be spread over time  [and] and for each type of manufacturing process, be 
thoroughly examined from the point of view of the various human problems a departure may bring 
with it ». In view of the usual strikes at Billancourt and since it made Renault one of the main 
bastions of trade unionism in France, the labour policy was the subject of a great deal of attention 
but did not seem to be able to check a process that was considered definitive. 
In the mid-1960s, regional planning policies provided yet more grounds for the subcontracting 
process. Indeed, industrial concentration in the Paris region had hitherto been justified by many 
factors such as the proximity of manpower resources, access to a major consumer market and access 
to raw materials and subcontractors. Nonetheless, the political will to relieve congestion in this 
region and to remove industrial centres from Paris was expressed in strong incentives to relocate. 
Created and developed around Louis R enault’s workshop  in 1898, the  Renault factories were 
                                                 
22 Central Department for Staff and Labour Relations  
23 Internal memorandum dated 18 February 1964 entitled : “Human implications of the move to outsourced 
manufacturing ».  
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radically reorganised: decentralised factories and subsidiaries were created, manufacturing 
processes were transferred to provincial subcontractors, space was made available in Billancourt 
and the manufacture of certain  secondary products related to automobile manufacturing were 
abandoned. Political measures for regional planning created an opportunity for the new Chairman 
and M.D., Pierre Dreyfus, to rationalise still further Régie Renault’s industrial tool.  
 
Outsourcing driven by internationalisation 
Appointed in 1955 to succeed Pierre Lefaucheux at the head of  Régie Renault, Pierre Dreyfus
24, 
who had been Vice-Chairman since 1948, has often been described as «  the internationalist » 
(Loubet, 2000). The American market was one of his first targets from the late 1950s onwards. 
Although the introduction on this market of the 4CV and the Dauphine was a resounding 
commercial success from the point of view of the number of vehicles sold
25, it was also a financial 
drain on account of the many technical problems that arouse due to the unsuitability of Renault cars 
for American motoring (Loubet, 2000). Despite this mixed success, the internationalisation 
movement gathered momentum from the lessons learnt in America. Indeed, the technical problems 
responsible for this failure forced Renault to change its policy. Henceforth, vehicles were no longer 
exported in their finished state but were assembled on arrival. Thus was Renault’s presence 
increased in Europe and South America and its arrival in Spain was the first real success of its 
international strategy. 
The internationalisation of trade increased competition between French and foreign manufacturers. 
Consequently, Dreyfus started looking for European allies for the Régie. Talks were begun with 
Volkswagen and Alfa Roméo at the beginning of the 1960s but came to nothing. According to 
Loubet (2000), the failure of this lay in the Regie’s statutes which made it impossible for 
manufacturers to have shares in Renault's capital
26. Finally, the search for international partners 
resulted in Franco-French cooperation in 1966 with the French manufacturer, Peugot and took the 
form of a « technical collaboration » that reinforced the company’s outsourcing policy once again. 
Indeed, in a bid to limit the frantic competition, the directors of these two firms agreed to greater 
standardisation of parts between the two brands and tried to implement a common purchasing 
policy so as to benefit from bulk. An internal document dated May 1972 presents the first 
conclusions from this partnership with regard to the common purchasing policy:  
« As far as the purchasing offices are concerned, work on standardising the specifications has 
begun. A certain number of spare parts have already been standardised, enabling suppliers to 
                                                 
24 He was to remain there until 1975. 
25 In 1959, Régie Renault sold more cars in the United States than Volkswagen (Loubet, 2000).  
26 It was a public company.  
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work on bigger series and to lower their prices. The most spectacular result of this policy is 
the joint choice of a type of seat belt.  
This initiative will only really bear fruit when the future models of each of the manufacturers 
designed in accordance with this policy are being manufactured» [ Peugeot-Renault 
Partnership Document, 1972, p.2].  
Within the framework of this partnership, two entities, the «  department of coordination and 
purchasing research » and the «  common purchasing commission », were created to identify the 
materials, semi-finished goods and capital goods that might be needed and to coordinate purchasing 
policies. The seat belts are a good illustration of the gains to be obtained through centralising the 
purchases of these two manufacturers. 
All in all, the partnership between the two was beneficial, bringing with it an average increase of 
51% in production between 1966 and 1971
27. 
This Franco-French agreement did not diminish the desire for internationalisation. Although Régie 
Renault’s subcontractors had mainly been selected from the domestic market, the trend to 
internationalisation was now affecting them. In 1972, the Management Report stated that within the 
framework of international activities, Renault had increased its purchases of materials, parts and 
units from abroad, developing new purchasing channels in Mexico and Yugoslavia
28.  
The partnerships agreed with French and foreign manufacturers 
29 were also an occasion for Pierre 
Dreyfus to redefine the organisation chart of  Régie Renault and to identify the remits of each 
department. The Purchasing Department was one of the eight big departments that were directly 
attached to the presidency
30. With a view to formalising the various fields of activity and 
responsibility in these eight big departments, the tasks of each were clearly laid down:  
« The Purchasing Department is responsible for providing Régie Renault with everything that 
it does not make and is responsible to the Manufacturing Department. It outsources or, 
possibly procures, within the framework of compensation operations with certain countries, 
the materials and products to be incorporated in the manufacturing processes as well as 
capital goods and general products with the exception of civil engineering, property and 
advertising. It discusses specifications in agreement with the competent technical departments 
and chooses the suppliers and subcontractors. It does this in conditions of consistency and 
security of supply such as will ensure a level of quality that conforms to the specifications and 
                                                 
27 More precisely, the 1972 document states that Renault and Peugot production increased by 66% and 59% 
respectively between 1966 and 1971 as a result of the partnership.  
28 Cf. Management Report 1972, p.20.  
29 The Peugeot-Renault partnership expanded in 1971, to include Volvo for the manufacture of engines. However, 
collaboration between the two French manufacturers did not last due to the entry of Citroën into the Peugeot Group in 
1974.  
30 Cf. Appendix 1 of memorandum n°2 044 dated 24 October 1973, entitled: Régie Renault – General Organisation.  
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under the most competitive economic conditions possible. It prepares, for the future, the 
conditions which should enable the needs of the company to be adequately met. Its Technical 
Reception Department prepares, checks and if need be corrects, the quality of the products it 
buys» [Appendix 2 of memorandum n°2 044 of 24 October 1973, entitled: Departmental 
Missions].  
 
Besides all these remits, the Purchasing Department was also involved in the preparation of the 
company’s industrial policy and more particularly, in decisions relating to changes in 
manufacturing methods in consultation with the manufacturing department.  
The Purchasing Department therefore acquired an important place within the Régie as a result of the 
continuing growth of its activity. Indeed, the Annual Management Report of 1972 emphasises that 
the cost of purchases increased that year by 12.5% compared to 1971
31. The increase was mainly 
due to bulk buying since average price  rises remained moderate as  the Report states. The 
continuing changes in subcontracting can be explained by the increase in production volumes 
brought about by the opening up of new markets as well as by the pursuit of a policy of vertical 
deconcentration. A report on the origin of t he parts for the Renault 14 clearly highlights the 
importance of the suppliers in the production of the brand’s vehicles: bodywork (Sollac, Usinor and 
Chatillon-Commentry), gear boxes, suspensions, steering systems, brakes, electrical equipment, 
leather parts and windscreens (Saint-Gobain) were machined by various outside suppliers. The high 
degree of vertical integration that characterised the Renault factories after the War was now 
definitely a thing of the past.  
A sign of the growing importance of the Purchasing Department was that it was divided into four 
sub-sections: raw materials and wrought products, bodywork and petrochemicals, electrical and 
mechanical equipment and finally, industrial equipment and supplies. These sub-sections were 
themselves divided up into 5 or 6 sections depending on the type of material, part or unit
32. This 
new form of organisation shows that the use of subcontractors involved just as much activities with 
little added value as those requiring a high level of specific technical expertise. Moreover, the 
nature of the relationships between Renault and its suppliers depended on the nature of the link 
between them. Questioned about the consequences of subcontracting if production slowed, the 
manufacturing director cited two possibilities; one where a contract exists and one where there is no 
contract between these two parties:  
« When there is no contract linking  the Régie with an outside supplier, it is generally the latter who 
bears the drop in production. When a contract is signed, the R.N.U.R. tries to arm itself in advance 
                                                 
31 Cf. Management Report, 1972 p.20.  
32 Internal memorandum n°767 dated 17 December 1975.   
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against the drop in production by planning a reduction in subcontracting that is greater than the 
fall in production in its own workshops  » [Statement by the director of manufacturing to the 
company’s central committee in June 1970 and transcribed in a special number of the internal 
review, “Inter-cadres” in 1970].  
 
The relationships between Renault and its suppliers could therefore be contractual in nature, but 
even in this case, the ramifications of a drop in production were borne first by the subcontractor. 
Although closely dependent on its subcontractors, Régie Renault positioned itself as a principal 
(this is only natural, a client is called a principal). In 1972, a « Guide for suppliers  »
33, explaining 
the organisation of the purchasing department and those in charge of the different section within 
this division, was edited by Renault in order to  « formalise and manage » the relationships of the 
Régie with its suppliers. As the only point of contact with  the subcontractors, the purchasing 
department was responsible for choosing them in the first place after consultation with the Research 
Department
34. In 1973, the purchasing manager could therefore affirm that Régie Renault had used 
the same suppliers for a decade, therefore displaying a desire to cultivate loyalty intended to limit a 
rise in the cost price of vehicles whilst at the same time guaranteeing continual advances in the 
quality of materials, parts and other fittings.   
In the 1970s, subcontracting seemed to be fully developed and assimilated by Régie Renault. 
However, the emergence of difficulties in obtaining supplies rapidly raised questions on the 
possibility of reintegrating production processes that had previously been subcontracted. This was 
the case in particular in 1974 for braking equipment. Because of the various problems encountered 
with the principal supplier of braking equipment, « the hypothesis of the partial integration of [our] 
braking equipment by the R.N.U.R., which could take place in [our own] factories (in France and in 
Spain),for compensation operations and whilst taking account of [our] existing agreements »
35. This 
project was studied for one model of vehicle in order to analyse the possibility of reintegration. 
However, the project did not include the stopping of all external supplies for this type of component 
in that a «  second source of supply must be maintained from a traditional supplier ». A 
memorandum from the financial department followed, demanding a study of three aspects: the 
expected cost price, profitability and funding
36. The case of the Régie Renault braking equipment 
                                                 
33 The existence of this guide was revealed in the article-interview with Régie Renault’s director of purchasing 
published in “L’information du véhicule”, 1973, n°26, September, pp.33-48.  
34 Cf. the interview with the purchasing director of Régie Renault published in “L’information du véhicule”, 1973, 
n°26, Septembre, pp.33-48.  
35 Internal memorandum n°1 571 dated 30 May 1974 entitled: “Partial integration of braking equipment by the 
R.N.U.R.” 
36 Cf. Internal memorandum from the financial department n°12 820 dated 31 May 1974 entitled: “Intégration partielle 
d’équipements of freinage par la R.N.U.R.”  
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shows how difficult it is to achieve a balance between doing and having done. It also demonstrates 
the reversibility of the outsourcing process for certain production processes even when the trend 
seems well established at global level.  
At the dawn of a new decade, the director of manufacturing explained the subcontracting situation 
in Renault’s automobile sector and in particular, with respect to three models, the Renault 4, 8 and 
16. The table below sums up the situation for 1969
37. A momentum has been achieved and the level 
of recourse to outside suppliers has stabilised.  
 
 
 
Table 2 : Percentage of subcontracting for 3 models in 1969
38 
  Renault 4  Renault 8  Renault 16  Overall 
Suppliers and outside manufacturing  40.3  40.5  4.8  41 
Peugeot supplies  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Subsidiary supplies  4.7  5.4  4.7  4.9 
Sub total  45.2  46.0  47.6  46.1 
Renault supplies (materials + manufacturing costs)  54.8  54.0  52.4  53.9 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In 1945, Renault was a company characterised by vertical integration and one which refused, for 
reasons related to costs, quality and security of supplies, to use outside suppliers. However, the 
move by the firm to mass production with the 4CV made the need for outsourcing more pressing. 
The Régie remained cautious, but other factors were to direct it down this route: the example of 
foreign manufacturers and above all, the scarcity of capital and space. Outsourcing was therefore a 
way of «  sharing » insufficient resources. Lastly, from the 1950s onwards, Renault resolutely 
committed itself to this process. The Régie modified its structure as a result, and internationalisation 
marked the culmination of the change of strategy in the 1960s, then the 1970s. This article’s first 
contribution therefore resides in giving an account of outsourcing at Renault. It bridges a 
major historic gap: outsourcing has been the subject of only a few studies of this type. Some of 
these involve the automobile industry. Helper (1991) analyses the change in the United States from 
the 1980s onwards only. Lewis (2003) covers the period 1900-1930 but less from the point of view 
of outsourcing than that of the constitution of a local network around the town of Chicago. 
                                                 
37 Special number of the RNUR’s internal newsletter, « Inter-Cadres », intended for the company’s managers and 
engineers which transcribed the statement by M. Jardon, Director of Manufacturing on the company’s Central 
Committee on 18 and 19 June 1970.    
38 We do not have any averages for this period. Figures per vehicle may be less significant.   
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Besides this historic contribution, two other, more general, contributions appear in this paper. The 
first concerns details of client-supplier relationships. Over and above the case of Renault, we have 
been able to see how such a relationship is constructed.  Unstable, it gradually swings from a 
phobia of dependence on suppliers to the organised dependence of subcontractors on the 
manufacturer.  
The second contribution concerns the effects of outsourcing: effects within the organisation (see 
above) and also, more global economic effects.  Outsourcing by Renault resulted in the 
remodelling of the French, and then, over and above this, the foreign, industrial fabric of 
suppliers. By subcontracting certain of its production processes, Renault favoured t he 
modernisation of companies that were smaller and less subject to competition. The subcontracting 
process was therefore favourable to the updating, in particular in terms of technology, of part of the 
industrial sector. As Lewis (2003, p. 619) has shown, the automobile industry had the effect of 
structuring industry in the Chicago region of the United States: « one mechanical engineer noted: 
‘[As] the automobile industry began to exert a great deal of pressure on machine-tool manufacture 
and design’, machine-tool makers ‘found it necessary to make extensive and very expansive 
changes in their systems of production to meet the rapidly increasing demand for cars’ ». 
Outsourcing products therefore had a powerful effect on the economy. 
Lastly,  a theoretical contribution emerges from this paper: with regard to work on 
outsourcing, the story of Renault pinpoints current subjects of inter-organisational research. Firstly, 
the question of the various types of outsourcing (purchasing, subcontracting) and related methods of 
control is raised. In the beginning, Renault chose to buy products from suppliers. The terms 
« purchase » and « suppliers » are emblematic of the type of relationship that was created. The 
method of control by the market was then favoured, the criteria being security of supply, quality and 
price.  Then, subcontracting was favoured, with the design of the parts reserved for Renault 
technicians. Manufacturing alone was subcontracted. The monitoring of these subcontractors was 
carried out according to a  bureaucratic method as described by Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000): detailed specification, standards, rules, direct supervision of the working 
methods used by the subcontractors, etc.  
At the same time, the question of dependence was at the h eart of the concerns of the Régie’s 
managers during the years when outsourcing was booming. Obscured in the 1990s by questions 
linked to trust, researchers have now reintroduced this problem, recognising it as crucial because it 
has a strong influence on how trade is carried out (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2008). 
Lastly, the history of Renault raises questions on internal structures and their link with inter-
organisational relationships. Alongside the outsourcing process, the Régie strengthened the  
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purchasing function, which led to the creation of a purchasing department that occupied the same 
level in the hierarchy as the manufacturing department. It was decided that the purchasing 
department would be the only point of entry for subcontractors. In most of the work on inter-
organisational relationships, the companies involved are considered to be « black boxes » and their 
internal organisation is neglected. Yet an understanding of inter-company relationships is 
incomplete without a study of the internal structures that fashion these relationships (Donada and 
Nogatchewsky, 2008). The work of Hakansson and Lind (2004) invites researchers to explore these 
avenues more thoroughly. The history of Renault sets the example.         
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